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Promised Incentives on a Random Digit 
Dia1 Suwey 
DA VID CANTOR, BRUCE ALLEN, PA TRICIA CUNNINGHAM, MICHAEL 
BRICK, RENEE SLOBASKY, PAMELA GIAMBO AND GENE VIE VE KENNY 
Abstract: This paper presents the results of two experiments carried out to test the 
effectiveness of promised incentives for a random digit dial suwey (RDD) at the initial 
household contact (introduction) und at the stage of refusal conversion. The results of the 
experiments find no eflect of at either stage of the survey process. These results are 
contrary to those found by at least one other recent experiment, as well as the use of 
promised incentives used routinely to convert reluctant respondents by several survey 
organizations. The possible reasons for notfinding an eflect are discussed. 
Keywords: prenot@cation, interviewer effects, telephone survey 
There has been increasing pressure to maintain response rates on random digit dial (RDD) 
telephone surveys (Massey et al. 1997). With these pressures, it has become more 
common to use incentives on RDD surveys. Incentives have been found to be effective in 
increasing response rates for many types of surveys (Church 1993, Singer et al. 1996). 
However, their utility in an RDD context is unclear. Research outside of an RDD context 
has shown that promising money (or a gift) is not nearly as effective as providing the 
incentive at the time of soliciting cooperation. Since there is not generally an opportunity 
to pre-pay all RDD sample persons, the utility of promised incentives on RDD surveys is 
unclear. 
There has not been a great deal of research on the effectiveness of a promised incentive in 
the context of an RDD survey. Of the evidence that does exist, the results provide a mixed 
picture (CMOR 1996, Strouse and Hall 1997). The purpose of this paper is to report 
results from two experiments testing promised incentives on an RDD survey. One 
experiment tests promised incentives at the initial cal1;while the second experiment tests 
incentives at the refusal conversion stage. 
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1 Design of the National Survey of America's Families 
The experiments were conducted as part of the National Survey for America's Families 
(NSAF), a RDD .survey funded by a consortium of private foundations in the United 
States. It is being conducted by Westat for the Urban Institute. The purpose of the survey 
is to assess the impact of recent changes in the administration of a number of assistance 
prograrns for children and the poor. 
The NSAF consists of both a screening and an extended interview. The screening 
interview consists of a 3-5 minute battery of questions that is designed to select the person 
that should be administered the extended interview. This involves determining if there are 
any persons under 65 years old in the household and whether or not the family is above or 
below 200% of poverty. If there is someone in the right age-range and the household is 
sampled (based on poverty status) a respondent for the extended interview is selected. The 
extended interview is approximately 45 minutes in length and Covers a wide range of 
topics, including health, education, child care, income and receipt of social services. 
The experiments discussed below were done at the screening Stage of this process. Two 
important features of this design should be noted. First, because of the sampling 
algorithms, a majority of those that are called to do the screener are not eligible for the 
extended interview. They are eliminated either because they do not have any person in the 
household in the right age range or because they are not below 200% of poverty 
(approximately half of the households that are above 200% of poverty are sampled). 
Second, the person that answers the screening instrument is not necessarily selected to do 
the extended interview. For the sample of families, the extended interview respondent is 
that person that knows the most about the health and well-being of a randornly selected 
child (based on rosters compiled during the screener). For the sample of adults, the 
extended interview is done with a randornly selected adult. 
2 Promised incentives at the initial contact 
The first experiment was conducted as part of a series of small tests that compared 
alternative formats and designs of the introduction to the screener. This experiment tested 
the effectiveness of offering a $5 incentive. 
Design: There were a total of 6 experienced interviewers who participated in this 
experiment. Telephone numbers from a telephone directory were selected for calling. The 
areas called were concentrated in low income areas of Michigan, West Virginia, Virginia, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey. 
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The incentive introduction was: 
Hello, this is (NAME) and I'm calling for the Urban Institute, a private 
nonprofit research center that is interested in the well being of adults and 
families. We are preparing for a study on how changes in health care, 
education and human services in (STATE) are affecting people like yourself. 
We are offering $5 to those persons that are eligible and agree to participate in 
a telephone interview. 
To find out if someone in your household is eligible, I need to ask a few 
questions about who lives there. These questions will take about 3 minutes. 
The offer was targeted to the Person who was eligible for the study and who agreed to 
complete an extended interview. 
The "no-incentive" introduction was: 
Hello, this is (NAME) and I'm calling for the Urban Institute, a private 
nonprofit research center that is interested in the well being of adults and 
families. We are preparing for a study on how changes in health care, 
education and human services in (STATE) are affecting people like yourself. 
The primary outcome measure for the experiments was a "cooperation rate," which 
consisted of : 
CR = (Completes + Ineligibles)/(Completes + Ineligibles + Refusals). 
The numerator consists of persons who completed the entire screener because there was 
an eligible subject in the household and those households where no eligible subjects were 
found (i.e., household had no persons less than 65 years old). The denominator adds in 
those persons that refused to provide enough information to determine eligibility. No 
attempts were made to convert refusals. 
Results: As can be seen from the results in Table 1, inclusion of an offer of money 
actually reduced, rather than increased, the cooperation rate (53.3 vs. 60.6). The 
difference is marginally significant (pc. 15 using a two tailed test). 
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Table 1: Results of promised incentives by stage of offer 
One issue that became clear during this testing was that many respondents did not stay on 
the line long enough to hear the incentive offer. Of the 98 persons that refused the 
incentive offer, 77 individuals hung up either during or shortly after the introduction was 
read. Slightly over half of these (48) stayed on the line long enough to hear the offer of 
$5. The other 29 hung up before the introduction was finished. An additional 11 people 
hung up either during or right after the first question was read ("1s the Person at least 18 
years old and a member of the household?"). The speed of refusal was sirnilar to the "no- 
incentive" introduction - 78 of the 91 persons that refused hung up either during the 
introduction or at the first questionnaire item. 
At Initial Contact 
(Incentive of $5) 
At Refusal Conversion 
(Incentive of $25) 
Advance letter 
No- advance letter 
Left message 
Never left message 
Left message and 
interviewer was: 
Left on conversion 
Not left on conversion 
The interviewers generally did not think the offer of money was an effective way to gain 
the confidence and cooperation of the respondent. It was felt that the offer of money 
rnixed them in with telemarketing firms that try to trick individuals into staying on the 
Incentive 
53.3 
(210) 
27.4 
(1,019) 
27.7 
(495) 
27.1 
(524) 
35.0 
(329) 
23.8 
(690) 
39.0 
(1 97) 
29.1 
( 1 34) 
No Incentive 
60.6 
(23 1 ) 
28.5 
( 1,034) 
31.1 
(486) 
26.3 
(548) 
30.3 
(277) 
27.9 
(757) 
30.1 
(143) 
30.6 
( 134) 
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line and eventually sell them something or take their money. It should be noted, however, 
that these interviewers did not have any experience offering money in this context, they 
were highly experienced with doing government surveys that do not offer money. 
3 Promised incentives at refusal conversion 
A second experiment was conducted that tested the effectiveness of offering $25 to 
convert refusals at the screener level. 
Design: This experiment was conducted with a total of 25 interviewers during the initial 
stages of interviewing for the NSAF. The interviewers were initially selected from among 
the pool of individuals who were asked to work refusal conversion for the study. The 
sample consisted of a random subsample of those households where someone had refused 
to complete the screening interview within 6 of the 11 states that were included in the 
NSAF supplemented state sample (Texas, New Jersey, Massachusetts, California, New 
York, Florida). The 6 states were selected because they exhibited the lowest response 
rates in the sample. Half of the 2,323 cases were assigned to an incentive condition and 
half were assigned to a "no-incentive" condition. 
Cases were randomly assigned among the 25 interviewers. These initial cases were 
worked by the assigned interviewer until there was a callback assigned that crossed the 
interviewer's shift (e.g., call during the day, but the interviewer was scheduled for the 
evening). The average number of cases finalized by an interviewer was 79 (median 83), 
although there was quite a bit of variation around this average (standard deviation of 30). 
Several of the 25 interviewers dropped out of the study. Their cases were reassigned to 
other'interviewers. 
The interviews were conducted in a room that was isolated from the rest of the 
interviewing staff. There was some concern that if the experiment were being done in the 
proximity of normal production work, the offer of incentives would be overheard by other 
interviewers. 
The 25 interviewers were assigned to one of two groups. During the first half of the 
experiment, one group offered respondents $25 if they agreed to complete the screening 
interview. The introduction used for this was: 
Hello, my name is (NAME) with the National Survey of. America's Families. 
We are conducting this study for private foundations interested in education, 
health care, and other services in (STATE). The study has been endorsed by 
state govemments concemed with how recent changes in policies affect 
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people's lives. I am not asking for money. To show our appreciation for your 
help, we will send your household $25 for participating in the survey. 
Interviewers were allowed to deviate from this script in ways that they thought 
appropriate. During the training, interviewers were instructed to use the monetary 
incentive at any point in the interview they felt it would have the most impact. 
The other group of interviewers began with the "no-incentive" cases, using the 
introduction: 
Hello, my name is (NAME) with the National Survey of America's Families a 
study to see how recent changes in federal laws affect people's lives in your 
community. I am not asking for money - this is a study for private foundations 
on education, health care, and other services in the state of (STATE). 
Once half of the cases had been worked, the two groups of interviewers switched 
conditions. Group 1 worked "no-incentive" cases, while Group 2 worked the "incentive" 
cases. Switching between conditions was done to minimize any confusion related to 
erroneously offering money for a no-incentive case. 
Before the experiment began, the phone numbers were matched to a list of telephone 
directories. Those that matched and that had an address were sent a letter prior to the first 
refusal conversion call. For the cases with an incentive, the letter mentioned that $25 
would be provided if the screener was completed. 
Results: The basic results of the experiment are displayed in Table 1. These provide the 
Refusal Conversion Rates (completes/(refusals + completes)) by the incentive and no- 
incentive conditions. As can be Seen, the offer of $25 had no effect on the overall rate of 
conversions, with 27.4% for the incentive condition and 28.5% for the no-incentive 
condition. 
The prevailing hypothesis of why the incentive did not work is that respondents did not 
believe the offer of money. One way legitimacy of the offer might have been established, 
was through attempts to prenotify the respondent about the purpose of the call. 
Prenotification might provide respondents some opportunity to think about the substance 
of the study and, hopefully, decide that the call was part of a legitimate research effort 
(Dillman 1978). 
There were two forms of prenotification that were used on the study. As mentioned above, 
letters were sent to those respondents for whom addresses could be found in public 
telephone directories. This did not increase the effectiveness of the incentive. For those 
that received an advance letter, the conversion rate for the incentive group was not 
Cantor/Allen/Cunningham/BricWSlobas~/Giam bo/Kenny: Promised Incentives . . . 225 
statistically different from those in the "no-incentive" group (data not shown). 
A second form of prenotification was to leave a message on an answering machine. A 
message was left which contained information about the incentive the first time an 
interviewer had the opportunity to do so (no messages were left in subsequent calls). 
Table 1 displays data that partially Supports the hypothesis that this increased the 
effectiveness of the incentive. In those instances where a message was left, the conversion 
rate was about 5% higher in the incentive condition (t=1.28; pc.10, one tailed test). When 
messages were not left, the opposite was the case (t=1.78; pc.05; one tailed test). 
There are a number of differences between prenotification by the letter and the message 
machine. One is the difference in the mode of delivery of the message. The letter was 
mailed using addresses from published telephone lists. These addresses are not up to date. 
Consequently, some proportion of the letters are not actually delivered to the address to 
which the telephone number correspond (Traugott et al. 1997). Even if the letter is to the 
right address, it rnay never be opened or carefully read by the person who answers the 
phone. It rnay be thrown out as "junk" mail before opening or the person to whom it is 
addressed (and listed in the phone directory) rnay not be the person that the interviewer 
talks to. Finally, another set of letters were sent prior to the initial call rnade to the 
household when the study began. The letter for refusal conversion rnay have just been 
seen as providing more of the same information that had been rejected the first time. 
Consequently it rnay not have been taken very seriously or even read at all. 
Altematively, a message left on a machine could be heard by many people in the 
household. The person that plays the message is forced to listen to it in order to clear the 
machine. There is also evidence that leaving messages distinguishes calls from those of 
telemarketers, who generally do not leave messages (Xu et al. 1993, Tucke1 and Shukers 
1997). Unlike the letter, it provides an alternative method from the original prenotification 
letter to inform individuals about the study. It rnay not be seen, therefore, as providing 
redundant information and rnay be taken a bit more seriously. 
One final difference are the types of respondents each method reaches. The letter only 
reaches those that have an address listed in the phone book, while the message machine 
only reaches those persons that have a machine and did not answer the phone when the 
interviewer first called. 
When debriefed, interviewers were evenly split on the utility of the $25. Some 
interviewers felt that it provided an effective tool for converting respondents, while others 
provided the Same feedback as in the first experiment - they felt that it made them sound 
like telemarketers trying to sell the respondent something. There were rnixed feelings 
about when the incentive should be presented. Many interviewers felt that putting the 
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incentive at the very beginning of the introduction exacerbated problems with sounding 
like a telemarketer. They felt that it was first important to establish some credibility about 
the purpose of the call before 8mentioning the money. 
This qualitative information seemed to indicate that effective use of a $25 incentive may 
be subject to the skills of the interviewer. Subtle differences in the delivery of the 
introduction may make a significant difference in whether or not the incentive is 
effectively used. One way this may have manifested itself would be a condition of the use 
of incentives and interviewer experience. As noted above, all of the interviewers were 
trained to do refusal conversion as part of the experiment. If interviewers became more 
confident and skilled at conversion as the field period progressed (as is normal), then the 
use of the incentive may have also improved as the field period progressed. 
This would have shown up as a difference between interviewers who initially started with 
the incentive (Group 1) and those that offered it during the second half of the experiment 
(Group 2). This did not seem to be the case however. The differences in the incentive and 
no-incentive conditions were essentially the Same, regardless of when the interviewers 
were using the incentive during the experiment (Group 1 vs. Group 2). 
Use of the incentives may also be subject to more intrinsic qualities related to skills 
interviewers bring with them to the job. For example, there is quite a bit of variability 
across interviewers in their abilities to obtain high cooperation rates (Oksenberg and 
Cannell 1988, Collins et al. 1988). If these abilities are important for utilizing the $25 to 
convert refusers, then one might expect that the effect would vary by interviewer quality. 
To test this idea, we used two measures of quality, both of which utilized data obtained 
during NSAF field period. The first measure was the cooperation rate the interviewer 
achieved during the January to July NSAF field period.l These data are not consistent 
with the above hypothesis. The differences between the incentive and no-incentive 
conditions are not statistically different across the three groupings of interviewers (top 
third, middle third and bottom third). 
A second way used to measure interviewer skill was to subset interviewers by whether or 
not they were kept on refusal conversion for the length of the NSAF field period. When 
looking at only those that were permanently kept on refusal conversion also does not 
support the hypothesis that better interviewers could more effectively use the incentive. 
The experiment was conducted during a 4 week period in March-April of 1997. The NSAF was 
adrninistering initial screeners for much of 1997. 
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There is some evidence, however, that skill does interact with prenotification on the 
effects of incentives. Table 1 provides conversion rates for calls where a message was left 
by whether or not an interviewer was left on refusal conversion for the entire study. As 
can be seen, the significant effect of message machines is reduced to Zero for those 
interviewers that were eventuaily not kept on refusal conversion, while the effect for the 
best converters is still significant (t=1.78; pc.05; one tailed test). One should note, of 
Course, that these conclusions are not based on a luge number of cases or a large number 
of interviewers (approximately 25). These conclusions, then, must only be considered 
tentative and need further confirmation. 
4 Summary and conclusions 
The experiments reported above did not find an effect of promised incentives for either 
the initial screening cail or during refusai conversion. These results illustrate the relatively 
complicated role promised incentives may play in the context of an RDD survey. Overall, 
these results suggest that effective use of incentives varies by: (1) level of payment, (2) 
prenotification, (3) interviewer skill, and (4) method of presentation. 
In conclusion, these data provide no evidence that promised incentives provide a magic 
bullet in the survey researcher's search for maintaining respectable response rates on 
RDD surveys. None of the data presented above find a consistent and substantiai effect of 
promised incentives. If there is an effect, these data seem to indicate that it likely varies 
by a number of factors that are currently not well understood. Before implementing 
promised incentives on any particular RDD survey, therefore, it would probably be in the 
interest of both the Sponsor and the survey organization to experiment with its use before 
implementing it on a large scaie. 
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